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Abstract
As a new type of cyber attacks, advanced persistent threats (APTs) pose a severe threat to modern society. This
paper focuses on the assessment of the risk of APTs. Based on a dynamic model characterizing the time evolution
of the state of an organization, the organization’s risk is defined as its maximum possible expected loss, and the
risk assessment problem is modeled as a constrained optimization problem. The influence of different factors on
an organization’s risk is uncovered through theoretical analysis. Based on extensive experiments, we speculate that
the attack strategy obtained by applying the hill-climbing method to the proposed optimization problem, which we
call the HC strategy, always leads to the maximum possible expected loss. We then present a set of five heuristic
attack strategies and, through comparative experiments, show that the HC strategy causes a higher risk than all these
heuristic strategies do, which supports our conjecture. Finally, the impact of two factors on the attacker’s HC cost
profit is determined through computer simulations. These findings help understand the risk of APTs in a quantitative
manner.
Keywords: advanced persistent threat, risk assessment, expected loss, attack strategy, constrained optimization
1. Introduction
In this day and age, the functioning of most organizations, ranging from large enterprises and financial institutions
to government sectors and military branches, depends heavily on cyber networks interconnecting computer systems.
However, these organizations are vulnerable to multifarious cyber attacks. Traditional cyber attacks tended to compro-
mise lots of unspecified computer systems, with the goal of picking low hanging fruits. Conventional cyber defense
measures including firewall and intrusion detection have turned out to be effective in withstanding these cyber attacks
[1, 2].
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The cyber security landscape has changed drastically over the past few years. Many high-profile organizations
have experienced a new kind of cyber attacks — advanced persistent threats (APTs) [3]. Compared with traditional
attacks, APTs exhibit the following distinctive characteristics: (a) The attacker is a well-resourced and well-organized
group, with the goal of stealing as many sensitive data as possible from a specific organization. (b) Based on metic-
ulous reconnaissance, a preliminary advanced social engineering attack is launched on a few target users to gain
footholds in the organization’s network. (c) More and more systems are infected stealthily and slowly to gain access
to critical information, and preys are secretly sent to the attacker [4–6]. APTs can evade traditional detection, causing
tremendous damage to organizations. In practice, the detection of APTs involves complex analysis of activities in the
network of the targeted organization, which is far from mature [7, 8].
Taking a risk-based approach to security has long been the recommended way to secure an organization [9–11].
The critical shift is that in the past it was recommended but today owing to the APT it is required. In fact, it is no
exaggeration to say that everything performed in security should be mapped back to risk and justified by risk [5].
Normally, we are not going to eliminate a risk, because that would be too expensive or even impossible. Instead, we
are going to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, which depends on the critical information we are protecting. When
it comes to an APT, the risk taken by the targeted organization translates to the organization’s expected loss. When
it comes to an organization, it is appropriate to take the worst-case perspective of assessing the risk as the maximum
possible expected loss of the organization over all possible APT attacks. To our knowledge, there is no literature on
the risk assessment of APTs.
To assess the risk taken by an organization under APTs, the time evolution of the organization’s state has to be
modeled accurately. Due to the propagation nature of APTs, it is appropriate to characterize the evolution process
as an epidemic model [12–17]. In view of the persistence of APTs and taking the relevant network into account, the
evolution process should be modeled as a differential dynamical system with the network topology. The individual-
level dynamical modeling approach, which has been applied to a wide range of areas, ranging from epidemic spreading
[18–21] and malware spreading [22–30] to rumor spreading[31, 32], meets this requirement. Towards this direction,
a number of APT attack-defense models have recently been suggested [33–35].
This paper addresses the risk assessment of APTs. First, a dynamic model characterizing the time evolution of the
security state of an organization is established by employing the individual-level dynamic modeling approach. Then
an organization’s risk is quantified as its maximum possible expected loss. On this basis, the risk assessment problem
boils down to a constrained optimization problem, with the expected loss as the objective function. The influence of
different factors on an organization’s risk is illuminated through theoretical analysis. Extensive experiments exhibit
that an organization’s expected loss is unimodal with respect to the attack strategy. Hence, we speculate that the APT
attack strategy obtained by applying the hill-climbing method to the proposed optimization problem, which we call
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the HC strategy, always inflicts the maximum possible expected loss. To validate the conjecture, we formulate a set
of five heuristic APT attack strategies. A set of comparative experiments clearly show that the HC strategy causes a
higher risk than all the five heuristic strategies do. Hence, our conjecture is corroborated. Finally, the impact of two
factors, the attack duration and the attack budget per unit time, on the attacker’s HC cost profit is determined through
computer simulations. The results obtained help us understand the risk of APTs in a quantitative manner.
The subsequent materials are organized in this fashion. Section 2 measures an organization’s risk using its max-
imum expected loss, and models the risk assessment problem as an optimization problem. Section 3 reveals the
influence of different factors on an organization’s risk. An attack strategy is proposed in Section 4, which is shown
through comparison experiments to cause the maximum expected loss. Section 5 examines the impact of two factors
on the attacker’s HC cost profit. This work is closed by Section 6.
2. The modeling of the risk assessment problem
Suppose some attacker, who represents a well-resourced and well-organized group, is going to conduct an APT
campaign on an organization. The organization’s defender, who represents the security team affiliated with the orga-
nization, faces the following urgent and challenging problem:
The risk assessment (RA) problem: Estimate the potential loss of the organization.
This section is dedicated to the modeling of the RA problem. Our modeling process consists of six successive
steps: (i) characterize the state of the organization, (ii) describe the defense posture, (iii) formulate the attack strategy,
(iv) model the state evolution of the organization, (v) measure the risk of the organization, and (vi) model the RA
problem.
2.1. The state of an organization
Consider an organization with a set of N computer systems labelled 1, 2, · · · ,N interconnected by a network. Let
G = (V, E) denote the network, where each node stands for a system, i.e., V = {1, 2, · · · ,N}, and there is an edge
between node i and node j, i.e., {i, j} ∈ E, if and only if system i can communicate directly with system j. Let
A(G) =
[
ai j
]
N×N denote the adjacency matrix for the network, i.e., ai j = 1 or 0 according as {i, j} ∈ E or not.
The security level of a node is measured by the amount of the sensitive data stored in the associated system. Let
wi denote the security level of node i. In this work, we assume wi = di (1 ≤ i ≤ N), where di = ∑Nj=1 ai j denotes the
degree of node i in the network. This is because a node with a higher degree typically has a higher importance.
In what follows, it is assumed that at any time, each and every node in the network is in one of two possible
states: secure, i.e, under the defender’s control, and compromised, i.e, under the attacker’s control. Let Xi(t) = 0 and
1 denote the event that node i is secure and compromised at time t, respectively. The state of the organization at time
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t is characterized by the vector
X(t) = (X1(t), X2(t), · · · , XN(t)). (1)
Let S i(t) and Ci(t) denote the probability of the event that node i is secure and compromised at time t, respectively.
S i(t) = Pr {Xi(t) = 0} , Ci(t) = Pr {Xi(t) = 1} , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2)
The expected state of the organization at time t is characterized by the vector
C(t) = (C1(t),C2(t), · · · ,CN(t))T . (3)
2.2. The cyber defense posture
The cyber defense of an organization against APTs is twofold: prevention and response. The former aims to
protect the secure nodes in the organization’s network from compromise, while the latter is devoted to recovering the
compromised nodes in the network.
The prevention investment on a node consists of three parts: the cost for purchasing a set of security products
for the node, the cost for deploying and configuring the security products, and the cost for enhancing the user’s
awareness against advanced social engineering attacks. Let δi denote the prevention investment on node i. In this
work, we assume the prevention investment on each node is linearly proportional to the security level of the node, i.e.,
δi = δ × wi, where the positive constant δ is referred to as the prevention coefficient.
The response investment on a node consists of four parts: the cost for monitoring and analyzing the activities
related to the node, the cost for deciding on whether the node is compromised or not, the cost for isolating the node
from the network when it is compromised, and the cost for recovering the compromised node. Let γi denote the
response investment on node i. In this work, we assume the response investment on each node is linearly proportional
to the security level of the node, i.e., γi = γ×wi, where the positive constant γ is referred to as the response coefficient.
2.3. The cyber attack strategy
The threat of an APT campaign to the organization is twofold: external attack and internal infection. The former
is conducted by the attacker from outside of the network, while the latter is caused by the compromised nodes within
the network, both with the same goal of compromising the secure nodes in the network.
Let B denote the budget per unit time for attacking the organization. In this work, we assume B is a constant,
which is determined by the attacker prior to the campaign.
Let xi denote the cost per unit time used for attacking node i when it is secure. In this work, we assume xi is a
constant, which is determined by the attacker prior to the campaign. The attack strategy is characterized by the vector
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN). (4)
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Let ||x||1 denote the 1-norm of x, i.e., ||x||1 = ∑Ni=1 xi. Then, ||x||1 = B. Let ΩB denote the admissible set of attack
strategies,
ΩB =
{
u ∈ RN+ : ||u||1 = B
}
. (5)
Then, we have x ∈ ΩB.
2.4. A state evolution model of an organization
For fundamental knowledge on differential dynamical systems, see Ref. [36].
Suppose an APT campaign on an organization starts at time t = 0 and terminates at time t = T . To model the state
evolution of the organization, let us impose a set of hypotheses as follows.
(H1) Due to external attack and prevention, at any time a secure node i gets compromised at rate αxiδwi , where the posi-
tive constant α is referred to as the attack coefficient; which is proportional to the quality of the reconnaissance.
This hypothesis is rational, because the rate is (a) proportional to the attack cost per unit time, and (b) inversely
proportional to the prevention investment.
(H2) Due to internal infection and prevention, at any time a secure node i gets compromised at the average rate
β
∑N
j=1 a jiC j(t)
δwi
, where the positive constant β is referred to as the infection coefficient, which is typically small.
Indeed, this coefficient is controllable by the attacker so as to avoid detection. This hypothesis is rational,
because the average rate is (a) proportional to the probability of the event that each specific neighboring node
is compromised, and (b) inversely proportional to the prevention investment.
(H3) Due to response, at any time a compromised node i gets secure at rate γwi. This hypothesis is rational, because
the rate is proportional to the response investment.
This set of hypotheses is schematically shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Diagram of hypotheses (H1)-(H3).
Based on the above hypotheses, the evolution of the expected state of the organization is modeled as the following
differential dynamical system:
dCi(t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − γwiCi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N. (6)
We refer to the model as the Secure-Compromised-Secure (SCS) model. A SCS model is characterized by the 7-tuple
MS CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, x).
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2.5. The modeling of the risk assessment problem
For simplicity, we assume (a) the loss per unit time of an organization owing to a compromised node i is wi, and
(b) the profit per unit time of the attacker owing to the compromised node is also wi. This assumption is rational,
because the loss and profit both are proportional to the security level of the node.
Consider a SCS model MS CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, x). The expected loss of the organization caused by implementing
the attack strategy x is
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiCi(t)dt. (7)
In what follows, we define the risk of an organization as the maximum possible expected loss of the organization
over all admissible attack strategies. Let R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B) denote the risk of the organization,
R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B) = max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) = max
x∈ΩB
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiCi(t)dt. (8)
Obviously, the risk of an organization is dependent upon not only the security posture, (G, δ, γ), but the attack mecha-
nism, (α, β,T, B).
Therefore, the original risk assessment problem is modeled as the following constrained optimization problem:
max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiCi(t)dt,
s.t.
dCi(t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − γwiCi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N,
Ci(0) = C∗i , i = 1, · · · ,N.
(9)
We refer to the optimization problem as the risk assessment (RA) model. A RA model is characterized by the 7-tuple
MRA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B).
Let xˆ = (x1, x2, · · · , xN−1), and let
ΩˆB =
uˆ = (u1, u2, · · · , uN−1) ∈ RN−1+ : N−1∑
i=1
ui ≤ B
 . (10)
Then the RA model (9) can be written in reduced form as follows:
max
xˆ∈ΩˆB
Lˆ(xˆ; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiCi(t)dt,
s.t.
dCi(t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − γwiCi(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N − 1,
dCN(t)
dt
=
1
δwN
α
B − N−1∑
i=1
xi
 + β N∑
j=1
a jNC j(t)
 [1 −CN(t)] − γwNCN(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Ci(0) = C∗i , i = 1, · · · ,N.
(11)
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We refer to the optimization problem as the reduced risk assessment (RRA) model. An RRA model is also character-
ized by the 7-tuple MRRA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B). Obviously, we have
R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B) = max
xˆ∈ΩˆB
L(xˆ; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ). (12)
The RRA model will be used in Section 4.
3. The influence of different factors on the risk of an organization
Eq. (8) tells us that the risk of an organization is dependent upon the topology of the network, the fourth coeffi-
cients, the attack duration, and the attack budget per unit time. This section is committed to examining the way that
these factors affect the organization’s risk. For this purpose, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 1. (Chaplygin Lemma, see Theorem 31.4 in [37]) Consider a smooth n-dimensional system of differential
equations
dx(t)
dt
= f((x(t)), t ≥ 0, (13)
and consider the following two systems of differential inequalities:
dy(t)
dt
≤ f((y(t)), t ≥ 0, (14)
and
dz(t)
dt
≥ f((z(t)), t ≥ 0, (15)
where x(0) = y(0) = z(0). Suppose that for any a1, · · · , an ≥ 0, there hold
fi(x1 + a1, · · · , xi−1 + ai−1, xi, xi+1 + ai+1, · · · , xn + an) ≥ fi(x1, · · · , xn), i = 1, · · · , n. (16)
Then, y(t) ≤ x(t) and z(t) ≥ x(t) for all t ≥ 0.
3.1. The influence of the network topology
The following theorem discloses the influence of the network topology on the risk of an organization.
Theorem 1. The risk of an organization increases with the addition of new edges to the network.
Proof. Consider a pair of RA models, M(1)RA = (G1, α, β, δ, γ,T, B) and M
(2)
RA = (G2, α, β, δ, γ,T, B), where G1 is a
spanning subgraph of G2, i.e., G1 = (V, E1), G2 = (V, E2), E1 ⊆ E2. Let A(G1) =
[
a(1)i j
]
N×N , A(G2) =
[
a(2)i j
]
N×N . Then
a(1)i j ≤ a(2)i j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N. Let
(
C(1)1 (t), · · · ,C(1)N (t)
)
be the solution to the SCS model M(1)S CS = (G1, α, β, δ, γ,T, x) with a
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given initial condition,
(
C(2)1 (t), · · · ,C(2)N (t)
)
the solution to the SCS model M(2)S CS = (G2, α, β, δ, γ,T, x) with the same
initial condition. Then,
dC(1)i (t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a(1)ji C
(1)
j (t)
 [1 −C(1)i (t)] − γwiC(1)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N. (17)
dC(2)i (t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a(2)ji C
(2)
j (t)
 [1 −C(2)i (t)] − γwiC(2)i (t)
≥ 1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a(1)ji C
(2)
j (t)
 [1 −C(2)i (t)] − γwiC(2)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N.
(18)
It follows from Lemma 1 that C(1)i (t) ≤ C(2)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = 1, 2, · · · ,N. So,
L(x; G1, α, β, δ, γ,T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(1)
i (t)dt ≤
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(2)
i (t)dt = L(x; G2, α, β, δ, γ,T ). (19)
Hence,
R(G1, α, β, δ, γ,T, B) = max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G1, α, β, δ, γ,T ) ≤ max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G2, α, β, δ, γ,T )
= R(G2, α, β, δ, γ,T, B).
(20)
The proof is complete.
This theorem implies that the denser the network of an organization, the higher the risk of the organization will
be. So, busy business is always accompanied with high risk.
3.2. The influence of the four coefficients
The following theorem illuminates the way that the four coefficient in the RA model affects the risk of an organi-
zation.
Theorem 2. The risk of an organization ascends with the attack and infection coefficients, and descends with the
prevention and response coefficients.
The proof of this theorem is analogous to that of Theorem 1 and hence is omitted. The first claim exhibits that a
meticulous reconnaissance can enhance the risk of the target organization. The second claim demonstrates that a fast
infection can increase the risk. The last two claims show that an increase in security investment always reduces the
risk.
3.3. The influence of the attack duration
The following theorem reveals the influence of the attack duration on the risk of an organization.
Theorem 3. The risk of an organization goes up with the attack duration.
8
Proof. Consider a pair of RA models, M(1)RA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T1, B) and M
(2)
RA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T2, B), where T1 < T2.
Let
(
C(1)1 (t), · · · ,C(1)N (t)
)
be the solution to the SCS model M(1)S CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T1, x) with a given initial condition,(
C(2)1 (t), · · · ,C(2)N (t)
)
the solution to the SCS model M(2)S CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T2, x) with the same initial condition. Then,
C(1)i (t) = C
(2)
i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T1, i = 1, · · · ,N. (21)
So,
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T1) =
∫ T1
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(1)
i (t)dt =
∫ T1
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(2)
i (t)dt ≤
∫ T2
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(2)
i (t)dt
= L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T2).
(22)
Hence,
R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T1, B) = max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T1) ≤ max
x∈ΩB
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T2)
= R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T2, B).
(23)
The proof is complete.
3.4. The influence of the attack budget per unit time
The following theorem demonstrates the influence of the attack budget per unit time on the risk of an organization.
Theorem 4. The risk of an organization rises with the attack budget per unit time.
Proof. Consider a pair of RA models, M(1)RA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B1) and M
(2)
RA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B2), where B1 < B2.
Let A(G) =
[
ai j
]
N×N . For any x ∈ ΩB1 , we have
B2
B1
x ∈ ΩB2 . Let
(
C(1)1 (t), · · · ,C(1)N (t)
)
be the solution to the SCS
model M(1)S CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, x) with a given initial condition,
(
C(2)1 (t), · · · ,C(2)N (t)
)
the solution to the SCS model
M(2)S CS = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T,
B2
B1
x) with the same initial condition. Then,
dC(1)i (t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a jiC
(1)
j (t)
 [1 −C(1)i (t)] − γwiC(1)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N. (24)
dC(2)i (t)
dt
=
1
δwi
αB2B1 xi + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC
(2)
j (t)
 [1 −C(2)i (t)] − γwiC(2)i (t)
≥ 1
δwi
αxi + β N∑
j=1
a jiC
(2)
j (t)
 [1 −C(2)i (t)] − γwiC(2)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N.
(25)
It follows from Lemma 1 that C(1)i (t) ≤ C(2)i (t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = 1, 2, · · · ,N. Thus,
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(1)
i (t)dt ≤
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiC
(2)
i (t)dt = L
(
B2
B1
x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T
)
. (26)
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Hence,
R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B1) = max
x∈ΩB1
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) ≤ max
x∈ΩB1
L
(
B2
B1
x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T
)
≤ max
x∈ΩB2
L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) = R(G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B2).
(27)
The proof is complete.
4. An attack strategy
The RA model characterizing the RA problem has been established in Section 2. We are now confronted with the
problem of how to solve the model. As the RA model involves a higher-dimensional nonlinear objective function and
a dynamic constraint, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to solve the model analytically. In this section, let us
turn our attention to the numerical solution of the RA model.
4.1. The HC attack strategy
The goal of this subsection is to present a numerical method for solving the RA model. For this purpose, let us
first examine the unimodality of the objective function in the RRA model through computer experiments.
Experiment 1. Let G(2) be the connected graph with two nodes labelled 1 and 2. Fig. 2 plots the four functions
Lˆ(xˆ; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) with the following combinations of parameters:
G α β δ γ T B
G(2) 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(2) 0.5/1 1 1 1 10 10
For each of these functions, the sole maximum point is marked in Fig. 4. It is seen that these functions are all
unimodal.
Experiment 2. Up to isomorphism, there are only two different graphs with three nodes, G(3)1 and G
(3)
2 , which are
depicted in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 plots the eight functions Lˆ(xˆ; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) with the following combinations of parameters:
G α β δ γ T B
G(3)1 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(3)1 0.5/1 1 1 1 10 10
G(3)2 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(3)2 0.5/1 1 1 1 10 10
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of the objective functions in Experiment 1.
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
(b) G(3)2
Figure 3: Two connected graphs with three nodes.
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Figure 4: A graphical representation of the objective functions in Experiment 2.
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Figure 5: Six connected graphs with four nodes.
For each of these functions, the sole maximum point is marked in Fig. 4. It is seen that these functions are all
unimodal.
Experiment 3. Up to isomorphism, there are totally six different graphs with four nodes, G(4)i , i = 1, · · · , 6, which
are shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 6 plots a cross figure for each of the 12 functions Lˆ(xˆ; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) with the following
combinations of parameters:
G α β δ γ T B
G(4)1 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(4)2 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(4)3 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(4)4 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(4)5 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
G(4)6 0.5 0.5 0.5/1 1 10 10
It is seen that these cross functions are all unimodal. More extensive experiments demonstrate that the 12 original
functions are all unimodal.
We conclude from these and many similar experiments that the objective function in each RRA model is unimodal,
which in turn implies that the objective function in each RA model is unimodal. Hence, for each RA model, the
solution obtained through hill climbing is much likely to be optimal.
To formulate our hill-climbing method, we need to introduce a notion as follows.
Let MRA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B),  > 0 a small number. The -neighborhood of x ∈ ΩB, denoted N(x), is defined as
N(x) = {y ∈ ΩB : y − x has exactly two nonzero components, one being , the other -}. (28)
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Figure 6: Some cross figures of the functions in Experiment 3.
And every y ∈ N(x) is referred to as a -neighbor of x.
Now, we are ready to formulate our method for finding an attack strategy.
Algorithm 1 HILL-CLIMBING
Input MRA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B);  = 10−6.
Output x ∈ ΩB; L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ).
1: randomly choose x ∈ ΩB;
2: while x has a -neighbor y such that L(y; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) > L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T ) do
3: x := y;
4: end while
5: return (x, L(x; G, α, β, δ, γ,T )).
We refer to the attack strategy obtained by executing the HILL-CLIMBING algorithm on a RA model as the HC
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strategy for the RA model, and the expected loss owing to the HC strategy as the HC risk for the RA model.
It is seen from Experiments 1-3 that, for each of these RA models, the associated HC strategy is optimal. Through
extensive computer experiments, we conclude the following result.
For each and every RA model, the associated HC strategy is optimal.
4.2. Five heuristic attack strategies
To examine the optimality of the HC strategy, we need to make comparisons on larger networks between this
strategy and some other attack strategies. For this purpose, below let us formulate five heuristic attack strategies.
The first heuristic attack strategy is to use up the attack budget to attack a single node of the highest security level.
That is,
x = (0, · · · , 0, B, 0, · · · , 0), (29)
where the target node is of the highest security level, with the ice being broken arbitrarily. We refer to the attack
strategy as the highest security-level (HS) strategy.
The second heuristic attack strategy is to deplete the attack budget to attack a single node of the lowest security
level. That is,
x = (0, · · · , 0, B, 0, · · · , 0),
where the target node is of the lowest security level, with the deadlock being broken arbitrarily. We refer to the attack
strategy as the lowest security-level (LS) strategy.
The third heuristic attack strategy is to assign to each node an attack cost that is linearly proportional to the security
level of the node. That is,
x = (
Bw1∑N
i=1 wi
,
Bw2∑N
i=1 wi
, · · · , BwN∑N
i=1 wi
). (30)
We refer to the attack strategy as the security-level first (SF) strategy.
The fourth heuristic attack strategy is to assign to each node an attack cost that is inversely linearly proportional
to the security level of the node. That is,
x = (
B
w1∑N
i=1
1
wi
,
B
w2∑N
i=1
1
wi
, · · · ,
B
wN∑N
i=1
1
wi
). (31)
We refer to the attack strategy as the security-level last (SL) strategy.
The fifth heuristic attack strategy is to allocate the attack budget uniformly among all nodes. That is
x = (
B
N
,
B
N
, · · · , B
N
). (32)
We refer to the attack strategy as the uniform (UN) strategy.
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Figure 7: The small-world network GS W .
4.3. Comparative experiments
This section conducts experimental comparisons between the HC strategy and the five heuristic attack strategies
in terms of the expected loss. For this purpose, let us describe three networks that will be used in the following
experiments.
Small-world networks are networks that are generated by randomly rewiring some edges of regular networks. Fig.
7 plots a small-world network with 50 nodes, which is obtained by executing the algorithm proposed by Watts and
Strogatz [38]. Let GS W denote this network.
Scale-free networks are networks with an approximate power-law degree distribution. Fig. 8 depicts a scale-free
network with 50 nodes, which is obtained by executing the algorithm proposed by Barabasi and Albert [39]. Let GS F
denote this network.
Fig. 9 exhibits a realistic network with 49 nodes, which comes from Ref. [40]. Let GKO denote this network.
Experiment 4. Consider a set of RA models (G, 1, 1, 1, 1,T, B), where G ∈ {GS W ,GS F ,GUS }, either (a) T = 5 and
B ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}, or (b) B = 10 and T ∈ {5, 6, · · · , 15}. For each of these RA models, the HC strategy is compared
with the five heuristic attack strategies in terms of the expected loss, and the experimental results are all shown in Fig.
10. It is seen that, for all these RA models, the HC strategy outperforms the five heuristic strategies.
Based on extensive experiments, we conclude that the HC strategy for each RA model is optimal, i.e., the HC
risk is exactly the maximum possible expected loss. This implies that the HC strategy is the biggest threat to an
organization, and the HC risk is an indicator of the organization’s risk.
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Figure 8: The scale-free network GS F .
1
2
3
4
5
67
8
910
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Figure 9: The realistic network GUS .
5. Further discussions
Consider a RA model MRA = (G, α, β, δ, γ,T, B). For an attack strategy x, the expected cost benefit of the attacker
is
L(x)
BT
=
1
||x||1 ·
1
T
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
wiCi(t)dt. (33)
We refer to the expected cost benefit associated with the HC strategy as the attacker’s HC cost benefit. Based on
the results given in the previous section, the HC cost benefit is much likely to be the highest cost benefit an attacker
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Figure 10: The results in Experiment 4.
can achieve. Therefore, both the attacker and defender should be concerned with the influence of the attack budget
per unit time and the attack duration on the HC cost benefit. This section examines these influences.
5.1. The influence of the attack budget per unit time
First, let us examine the influence of the attack budget per unit time on the HC cost benefit.
Experiment 5. Consider a set of RA models MRA = (G, 1, 0.5, 1, 0.5,T, B), where G ∈ {GS W ,GS F ,GUS }, T ∈
{5, 10, 15}, and B ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 10}. For each of the RA models, the HC cost benefit is plotted in Fig. 11. It is
seen that the HC cost benefit drops with the attack budget per unit time.
Extensive experiments exhibit similar phenomena. Hence, we conclude that the HC cost benefit always declines
with the attack budget per unit time. Therefore, the power of APTs is limited in terms of the HC cost benefit. This
sounds a good news for organizations under APTs.
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Figure 11: The results in Experiment 5.
5.2. The influence of the attack duration
Second, let us examine the influence of the attack duration on the HC cost benefit.
Experiment 6. Consider a set of RA models (G, 1, 0.5, 0.5, 1,T, B), where G ∈ {GS W ,GS F ,GUS }, B ∈ {5, 10, 15}, and
T ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 10}. For each of the RA models, the HC cost benefit is plotted in Fig. 12. It is seen that, with the
extension of the attack duration, the HC cost benefit goes up but flattens out quickly.
Extensive experiments exhibit similar phenomena. This result demonstrates that, although a short-term APT can
achieve a significant increment in HC cost benefit, this increment would become inappreciable with the prolonged
attack duration. This conclusion is a good news for organizations, because the motive to conduct an extended APT
campaign recedes.
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Figure 12: The results in Experiment 6.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has dealt with the problem of assessing the risk of APTs. Based on a state evolution model of an
organization, the risk of the organization is measured by its maximum expected loss, and the risk assessment problem
is modeled as a constrained optimization problem. Our theoretical study expounds the way that different factors affect
an organization’s risk. We speculate from experiments that the attack strategy obtained by applying the hill-climbing
18
method to any instance of the proposed optimization problem leads to the maximum expected loss. Comparative
experiments support our conjecture. The impact of two factors on the attacker’s cost profit is determined through
computer simulations.
There are many open problems toward this direction. This work builds on the premise that the defense posture
is fixed. To enhance the security of an organization, the cyber defender may well flexibly adjust the defense posture
over time. In this context, the optimal control theory provides an appropriate framework for developing cost-effective
defense strategies [41–46]. In situations where the attacker and defender are both strategic, it is feasible to assess
the risk of APTs in the framework of game theory [47–50]. In this work, the network of an organization is assumed
to be fixed. In reality, this network may well vary over time [51–55]. So, it is of importance to assess the risk
of APTs in this context. The identification of propagation resources in complex networks is a hotspot of research
in the field of cyber security [56–59]. We suggest to utilize the state evolution model established in this work to
identify the footholds of the attacker in a network. Also, it is rewarding to extend this work to the more realistic
scenarios where queuing networks are involved [60]. In recent years, cloud computing has been extended to the edge
of organizational networks, forming fog computing [61–65]. In this context, the assessment of the risk of APTs must
be a huge challenge.
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